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Letting-be 
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Petals of Blood 
Grant Farred 
Cornell University 
What is it to dwell? 
Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking” 
It is dwelling that allows mortals to initiate themselves in time and space. As 
such, dwelling constitutes the event of being. In his essay “Building 
Dwelling Thinking,” Martin Heidegger stipulates that dwelling can only be 
achieved through harmonious relations among the constituents, earth, sky, 
mortals and gods (“divinities”), of the “fourfold.” Heidegger writes, “To 
preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the 
divinities, to initiate mortals – this fourfold preserving is the simple essence 
of dwelling.”1 Initiating themselves in time and space is the great difficulty 
that the residents of Ilmorog, the remote village in postcolonial Kenya in 
which Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s novel Petals of Blood is set, experience; in Petals of 
Blood, dwelling is what defines mortals’ being.  
In Petals of Blood, moments of dwelling are rare (and intensely rural), 
rendering Ngugi’s iteration of postcolonial dwelling in a distinctly 
Heideggerian register. Ngugi’s romanticized vision of rural life in 
postcolonial Africa as the only condition in which dwelling can be conceived 
echoes Heidegger’s own romantic nostalgia for rural life in Germany – that 
mythic, architecturally perfect and environmentally constructed 
“farmhouse” that Heidegger so venerates. Heidegger’s builder is acutely 
aware of the geographical vagaries of the place in which he – we have no 
doubt that it is a man who is at work here – builds this farmhouse; he takes 
care, in building, to account for the direction of the wind and the rain; he 
takes advantage of the protection offered by the mountains, and so on. This 
act of building is what it means to dwell, “thought essentially.” The being of 
human beings is, as it were, secured by and is possible only through 
dwelling. 
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In Ngugi’s novel Heidegger’s question “What is it to dwell?” serves to 
render the Kenyan postcolonial as a threat to being, registering Heidegger’s 
question as the existentialist critique at the core of Petals of Blood. In 
Heidegger’s essay “What is it to dwell?” assumes a range of forms, 
beginning with inquiries into the relationship between dwelling and, to take 
liberties here, the postcolonial, the conditions under which postcolonial 
conditions dwelling is possible, and, critically, whether it is possible to 
conceive of dwelling without violence. Or, in the terms of this essay, must 
dwelling and violence be thought together under the condition of “letting-
be?” The way in which this last question is posed suggests less an inquiry – 
which retains in it always something tentative, a hint of uncertainty and 
openness to a different prospect – than a dire articulation. It seems, in our 
moment when the postcolonial state is burdened by “an epidemic of low 
expectations,”2 a moment dramatized by Ngugi in Petals of Blood when 
postcoloniality was still a first-generation political project, that it is indeed 
impossible to conceive of dwelling as a postcolonial letting-be that is 
without violence. But if the postcolonial condition is, to amend a phrase 
from Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of the state, an almost “unthinkable object,” 
then what Ngugi’s novel makes immanent is the obvious determination to 
think dwelling as an intense complexity. 
Petals of Blood begins from the premise that dwelling is best articulated 
as a desire for peace and oneness with the earth, if not the all of the fourfold. 
This essay proceeds in that spirit, and works in those terms (for the most 
part, because already there is reason enough to be skeptical of such a notion 
of dwelling) in the first section. What emerges, because of Ngugi’s text itself, 
is the refiguring of dwelling as a mode of being that might properly be 
named “letting-be.” This essay thus pivots on the tension between dwelling 
as the desire for peace (an entirely plausible, even laudable, ambition for the 
postcolonial project) and a critique of this desire as romanticization because 
every moment of peace invariably seems limned by the portent of violence; 
this essay negotiates, in short, between dwelling (peace) and letting-be, 
between dwelling as “monolingual” and polyvalent. It is a tension that is 
not, conceptually, resolved (perhaps because a resolution is, necessarily, 
impossible) but it is the conceptual difficulty that drives the essay. 
To let-be is a mode of being in which everything, every aspect of life, 
is manifestly present. To let-be presupposes a radical openness to the 
fourfold—to the world—so that dwelling is best recognized as an intense 
understanding of how to be in the world, of what it means to be. In its 
radical openness, to let-be admits of everything in the world. Letting-be, 
then, is to know dwelling as living manifestly, to be fully “there” in the 
presence of peace (a rare occurrence in Ilmorog; but all of Ngugi’s 
protagonists are in search of peace) as well as under conditions of violence 
inscribed in the “blood” of Ngugi’s title. To let-be is to desire dwelling as the 
highest mode of peace, to struggle against violence (in its many 
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manifestations), but it is also to know how to be in the midst of the violent 
struggle against violence that can never truly overcome that violence. To 
name violence as constitutive of dwelling is to understand dwelling as a 
properly political project. To dwell is, in these terms, to recognize – to think 
[Denken] – the violence (and the inclining toward peace) that is at the core of 
dwelling. That is, to achieve dwelling is/as nothing less than a violent 
struggle; a violent struggle with the self, with building [Bauen], with 
dwelling [Wohnen] itself; to let-be the violence that so animates the struggle 
for dwelling, that is at once so inimical of violence and so proximate to it. 
 
A rare moment: the oneness of the rural women and/with 
the earth 
A teacher without any real personal or professional prospects, Godfrey 
Munira arrives in old Ilmorog, a dusty, godforsaken (the pun is 
unavoidable) village in postcolonial Kenya with an aging population. (The 
youth and the young adults of Ilmorog have decamped, in significant 
numbers, to the city in search of greater economic opportunities and social 
pleasures.) Munira is alienated both from his family, a “refugee from a home 
where certain things were never mentioned” – in this “home,” ruled over by 
his judgmental father, sex and desire were among the chief 
“unmentionables” to Munira’s puritanically Christian wife – and the politics 
of postcolonial Kenya (“Any talk of colonialism made him uneasy”).3 As a 
Kenyan who did not participate in the war of liberation against British 
colonialism, the promise of a dwelling is what draws Munira to Ilmorog.4 
This is also true of Ngugi’s other protagonists. Wanja (a former prostitute 
who becomes Abdulla’s barmaid and later establishes herself as New 
Ilmorog’s chief entrepreneur in the sex industry; she is also lover to both 
Munira and Karega), Abdulla (the former Mau Mau fighter who is crippled 
by the war against the British colonialists), and Karega (a young militant 
who was once Munira’s prize pupil at New Ilmorog Primary), all come in 
search of peace; all of their various quests reveal dwelling as a complex 
interplay amongst peace, violence and interstitial moments that are neither 
peaceful nor violent. 
Not surprisingly, Munira’s understanding of dwelling turns on a just 
such an interplay between his remove (a superiority grounded in his 
education, the status afforded him as teacher; he stands aloft, but not alone 
in the political economy of village life) and the eroticized pleasure which the 
autochthony of rural Kenyan life gives him: “It was not only the high esteem 
in which the village held him: he cherished and was often thrilled by the 
sight of the women scratching the earth because they seemed at one with the 
green land.”5 Ngugi’s description of the oneness of mortals and the earth, 
the “women scratching the earth because they seemed at one with the green 
land,” is nothing other than the transcription of Heidegger’s dwelling fitted 
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for a postcolonial landscape in which that essential oneness of the fourfold is 
under threat.  
This oneness is itself saliently unprecedented for Munira, son of the 
Kenyan elite, and so the displaced schoolteacher is deeply affected by the 
presence of the peasant women tending the land. Munira is “thrilled by the 
sight of the women scratching the earth;” he is, such is the nature of his 
“thrill,” envious of their autochthony, their ability to be “at one with the 
green land.” This is the relationship of Gewohnte, embodying through their 
labor the history of their relationship to this land; one hears also in 
Heidegger’s term gewöhnen, the practice of “getting used to,” “getting 
accustomed to,” “familiar with,” which opens to the possibility of “habit” – 
the regular usage of a thing, the tendency to perform this task again and 
again. It is this practice, this mode of inhabiting – of living in and with, and 
of course because of – the land that Munira must learn; in observing the 
“oneness” of the women with the green earth he is learning how to both 
appreciate (from a distance, albeit an enthralled distance) their autochthony 
and to be, in Heidegger’s terms, their neighbor [Nachbar] – to be close to 
them, to imagine the possibility of emulating this relationship. Munira is 
confronting, through his watching, what it means to dwell (to be at peace, to 
be in oneness), to dwell through work, what it means to be near to, live in 
close proximity to, the other.6 For Ngugi (and no less for the Heidegger of 
the idyllic German farmhouse), dwelling is conceivable only as autochthony: 
It is rooted, unambiguously, in the earth, in the struggle to be one with the 
earth, to make the earth productive, to sustain mortals through engagement 
with the earth. In Petals of Blood, dwelling is grounded, terrestrial, with no 
possibility for autochtony. Dwelling, in this rendering, could not take place 
in, say, a space ship; dwelling is strictly an earthbound possibility and as 
such it is bound up in the difficulties – the politics – of letting-be. 
There is, then, a certain nostalgia that grounds Ngugi (and 
Heidegger’s) romanticism for rural life in sub-Saharan Africa (and rural 
Germany). Nostalgia in Jacques Derrida’s “nostalgeric” sense, which 
designates that irrecoverable place from which the postcolonial self can 
never be untethered, from which it can never disarticulate itself;7 and yet, it 
is to that selfsame place that the diasporized postcolonial can never return, 
that site of violence done to the self from which the self can never sever 
itself, that place of letting-be. In Petals of Blood the village of Ilmorog 
constitutes the autochthone. But the old Ilmorog is not New Ilmorog. The 
village that we might name the old Ilmorog is a name, an act of naming, 
haunted by mourning. New Ilmorog is that place which succeeds, through 
economic displacement, the old Ilmorog. This economic displacement, a 
process that involves capital investment, transforms the village into an 
industrial town; New Ilmorog thus marks the loss of rural life and, hence, 
autochthony. Etymologically speaking, “springing from the earth” (but also 
remaining felicitous to that grounding), the autochthone is the postcolonial 
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mode of being that Ngugi endorses, an underwriting that opens onto the 
complications of letting-be where the autochthone is always in the presence 
of violence as much as it strives toward oneness (peace). As such, the 
autochthone stands in a fabulously puzzling relation to the fourfold. The 
autochthone at once underscores the rootedness in and of the earth and 
throws into question any notion of “transcendence;” Ngugi’s autochthone 
would seem to resist any prospect that challenges or undermines the 
primacy of the earth. The autochthone cannot admit of a life – the act of 
living – that does not spring from the earth, that springing from the earth 
that holds Munira so in its thrall, the springing forth that seems to condense 
dwelling into being, and being into the letting-be violence/oneness of 
dwelling.       
Held out in the act of Munira’s observation is a different mode of 
being in postcolonial Kenya, a possibility previously unimaginable to him, a 
possibility enabled entirely by Ilmorog. The ultimate promise of the Nachbar 
is to provide the possibility of being in peace (to suspend, if even for a 
moment, the violence that marks dwelling): “ich bin, du bist, I am, you are.”8 
To dwell is to be; to be is incline toward dwelling; to observe those who 
dwell, to be thrilled by their dwelling is to increase the likelihood of being. 
Heidegger asserts that “the manner in which we humans are on earth, is 
bauen, dwelling,” directly linking building to dwelling and in so doing 
establishing a relationship of being to dwelling.9 There is a mutuality 
between Sein and bauen; a sharing, if you will, is established.10 It becomes, 
then, almost impossible to determine primacy. One cannot, plausibly, ask 
about which comes first: Sein or bauen? How, under these circumstances, is it 
possible to think Sein and bauen discretely? It becomes impossible to think 
one without the other, to think first one and then the other. All these 
inquiries must be posed in, and through, a single interrogative gesture.  
It is only possible to be (we–all–are) when we dwell (bauen: when we 
build to dwell; when dwelling is the first condition for building). Watching 
from a distance, all the while drawn to it, drawn into it, this act of the 
Ilmorog women bauen is, in all probability unknown to him (and yet 
powerful in its sentience; in this case a sentience deriving from the nearness 
of the Nachbar, to the other in their familiarity, in their shared affinity for the 
land, for its history), at the affective base of Munira’s thrill. (If, in Yogi 
Berra’s memorable phrase, “You can observe a lot just by watching,” then 
we can learn a great deal about both Ilmorog’s political economy and 
Munira’s remove from it “just by watching” Munira “observe” the women at 
work.) In crypto-psychological terms, bauen is the magnetic force that opens 
onto being. It is bauen that opens mortals to being, and it is toward Sein that 
Munira is being instructed through his observation of the women. To 
translate Munira’s experience as a Yogi Berra truism: you can learn a lot 
about yourself, your desires, your rootedness or your alienation, (just) by 
observing others. 
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It is within this philosophical framework that the women of Ilmorog 
are “building,” [“Bauen”], are tending more than their crops. They are 
building, nurturing (caring for the land, caring what is to hand, caring for 
what it is their hands have wrought) their essential relationship: that of the 
women and, by extension, the (history of the) community of Ilmorog to the 
land. The crops that they are growing link (all of) Ilmorog to the land. 
Caring for the crops with their labor is caring for the land—a deeply 
historicized postcolonial romanticization of Blut und Grund, in all its political 
difficulties, a romanticization that acknowledges the women’s physical labor 
but cannot quite acknowledge the violence of the struggle between mortals 
and the earth; mortals are always subject to the climatic vagaries that 
emanate from the earth or the sky. The relationship amongst Munira, the 
women, and this instance of dwelling is grounded in a momentarily shared 
commitment to Bauen. As Heidegger says, to build is to “cherish and protect, 
to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine.”11 
Impossible to ignore here again is how Ngugi and Heidegger, the 
rugged anti-colonialist (in addition to vehemently opposing its successor, 
neocolonialism) and the politically tainted existentialist, share the language 
of romanticized attachment to the land. For his part, Munira “cherishes” the 
relationship between mortals and the earth; to “cherish the soil” is for 
Heidegger a precondition for how human beings dwell – and a political 
sensibility. Bauen, says Heidegger, “originally means to dwell;” it means, we 
might say, to imagine a oneness between Ngugi’s laboring women and the 
fecundity that emanates from their hand, as evidenced, of course, by the 
“green land” that they have produced.12  
The crops, the “green,” at once obscures the land (the crops cover the 
land with their plenty, a good thing for the community; it means that they 
have provided for themselves for yet one more season) and reifies it because 
it is this very bounty of the land that reaffirms the relationship amongst 
Bauen, Wohnen and Sein: building (sowing, weeding, reaping, preparing the 
soil for the next season), dwelling (being at peace in the land because of 
what the land and the community’s labor provides; continuing to labor in 
the face of climatic uncertainty), and Being (dwelling in peace). Cast in such 
a light, it is left to Munira – appropriately, perhaps, in his role as teacher – in 
his observation to provoke us to think [Denken] this relationship, this web of 
connections that binds and sustains rural life in Ilmorog. Munira is tasked 
with comprehending the event, all of which turns on him naming the event, 
as such, without naming it an event. In his role as a Baldwinian witness, 
Munira has to stipulate to the occurrence of the event;13 in James Baldwin’s 
work the witness assumes the role of critical observer, of bearing witness to 
– speaking publicly, telling others – what the event is, what important 
occurrence is taking place within the community;14 the witness offers what 
might, in Michel Foucault’s terms, be designated a “veridicted truth.”15 
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It is in Ngugi’s “watching” Munira that it becomes possible to 
“observe” the seasonal nature of postcolonial dwelling, presented through a 
cycle of plenitude (“green earth”), want (long cycles of drought), and near-
destitution (the economic devastation that follows because of the drought), 
which leads to the undoing of old Ilmorog. It is, however, more complicated 
than to conflate the demise of old Ilmorog with the future impossibility for 
dwelling. When Munira observes the oneness of the women, there is already 
incipient within that act of dwelling the promise of violence – the violence to 
come, if you will, the violence of letting-be. The women’s oneness is a 
precarious act of being with the earth because the self-same earth that allows 
them, in the “Munira moment,” to do so peacefully will soon threaten them, 
through drought, with socio-economic death. There is always, as we shall 
see shortly, the always already presence of violence, even in the moment of 
plenitude. Death, the inevitability of death as such, is what orders—
knowingly or not—Ilmorog, the postcolonial world, the world itself. 
Once the rural fundament of postcolonial life is destroyed, through 
drought, crop failure or poor retail prices for the crops, what inevitably 
follows is some form of capitalist rupture. (Usually, but not exclusively, this 
rupture takes the form of industrialization of venture capitalism that puts 
paid to past relationships with the earth.) The fourfold of old Ilmorog is 
disrupted into a dystopic landscape. Native to the act of transformation (first 
in the line of occurrences), often biopolitically violent, is a radical change in 
temporal structure. “Ilmorog” is made simultaneously unrecognizable (new 
constructions, new modes of economic exchange, new relationships to the 
land, as well as the earth, sky and divinities) and antecedent to itself. 
The force of rupture renames the self through the violent addition of a 
“prefix” that is really an adjective (“New”). Following this logic, there is 
nothing to be done except divide “Ilmorog” temporally, an act utterly 
devoid of critical imagination as no one can conceive of an original name. 
Through this simple act, “old Ilmorog” is superseded by “New Ilmorog.” 
Capitalism, as we shall see, triumphs over the bucolic past. All that remains 
is to provide an itinerary and itemization of what has been lost, beginning 
and ending with dwelling. Petals of Blood, however, complicates the 
transition to capitalism through autoimmunity—tragically so, because 
capital is only able to make inroads into Ilmorog through a combination of 
crisis (the drought, a condition the villagers cannot control) and traditional 
practices (reproducing, in response to the crisis, in order to turn things 
around, those goods held sacred by the past).  
New Ilmorog it is, reductively phrased, best understood as the effect 
of old Ilmorog’s inadequacies (it has no material resources to sustain when 
natural disasters occur) and the Kenyan state’s structural indifference; 
Ilmorog belongs to the periphery and, as such, it suffers the fate, 
indifference, to which all state structures subject those who inhabit its 
outermost regions. In the moment that Ilmorog finds itself economically 
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destitute, there is no state practice (drought relief, educational sustenance, 
emergency funding or food supplies) committed to meeting its wants—an 
“epidemic” of non-delivery. The Ilmorog villagers are, in terms Marx might 
recognize, a population surplus to the functioning of the state, vulnerable in 
the face of postcolonial state’s indifference. The villagers are, as it were, no 
more than units of marginal economic utility. 
 
Theng-eta will save you, then it will kill your past 
Poetics…does not attempt to find a meaning but to 
understand the techniques that make meaning possible, 
techniques that belong to the generic tradition. 
Jonathan Culler, Theory of the Lyric 
In their attempt to save Ilmorog, the village elders, led by Nyakinyua 
(Wanja’s grandmother), decide to brew a traditional drink, “Theng-eta.” 
Nyakinyua leads the community in the brewing process, which she also 
presents as a lesson in the cultural history of Ilmorog. For Nyakinyua 
making the drink is a sacred practice: “Theng-eta” is a “dream. It is a wish. It 
gives you insight, and for those favoured by God it can make them cross the 
river of time and talk with their ancestors…. Only you take it with faith and 
purity in your hearts.”16 Initially, the drink brings relief from the drought, 
after which Abdulla begins to sell Theng-eta in his little shop (where Wanja 
still works, before her own entrepreneurial turn in New Ilmorog). As a 
consequence, its popularity spreads among the residents and itinerant 
migrant workers who pass through Ilmorog.  
However, the rising popularity (and profitability, however small scale) 
of Theng-eta causes aspirant capitalists such as the “business tycoon” 
Kimeria to seize it, commercialize it, and exploit it for their gain.17 Soon 
enough, “Theng-eta” is taken over by a multinational corporation 
comprised, unsurprisingly, in part by the new postcolonial elite. Most 
notable among the investors are “Chui – an educationist and a businessman; 
Hawkins Kimeria – a business tycoon…. Mzigo – an educationist turned 
businessman.”18 Kimeria, previously known as Nderi wa Riera before he 
Anglicized his name, harbors grand entrepreneurial dreams, modeled on a 
wide array of global capitalist dynasties.19 The new corporation, needless to 
say, has little or no consciousness of the drink’s ancestral significance; the 
native “tycoons” certainly make no promises that the mass-marketed 
version will make it possible to “cross the river of time” or “talk with 
ancestors.”  
When Nyakinyua, assisted by Abdulla, Wanja, and Munira, make that 
first batch of the brew they cannot possibly know that their offering to the 
gods will lead in short order to the drink’s popularity, to the usurpation 
(industrialization) of the production process and, most critically for them, 
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the undoing of Ilmorog. It is thus not hyperbolic to claim that the moment 
the villagers brew Theng-eta they are initiating, without any consciousness 
of the effects they are unleashing, the end of their way of life. That decision, 
to reach into the past in order to secure a better present, will have 
catastrophic consequences both for the future of Ilmorog, which is about to 
pass into history, and their own individual futures. 
For his part Nderi wa Riera is “convinced” that “Africa could only be 
respected when it had its own Rockerfellers, it’s Hughes, Fords, Krupps, 
Mitshubishis.”20 Full of capitalist hubris (the stuff of his postcolonial 
dreams), Nderi wa Riera seeks to take his place in this lineage of capitalist 
greats, beginning with the mass production of Nyakinyua’s sacred drink. 
Nderi’s dream of joining the ranks of the “Fords” and the “Krupps” is 
thwarted, but the consequence of his grandiosity is New Ilmorog, that 
“new” place where industrial production is replacing agricultural 
production as the primary form of economic life.  
This rapid transition from one form of production to another disrupts 
the fourfold. In the industrialized production of Theng-eta, unlike the labor 
involved in farming, the earth is no longer to be “saved,” nor does the earth 
have a special relationship to the sky or the divinities. What this new 
economy of capital transforms most radically is the relationship between the 
villagers (mortals) and the earth—what the earth no longer produces, how 
the earth no longer sustains peasant life. Because of industrialization, the 
sacred pact between Ilmorog residents and the earth is broken, a rupture 
that ostensibly divides the present rise and reign of capital from the past, 
where dwelling was at times possible. It is a rupture that divides the mortals 
from the “divinities.” 
However, this rupture appears to have been anticipated by Ndemi, 
who belongs to a previous generation. As such, the rupture is articulated as 
a dubious inheritance, an inheritance that is also a form of accountability to 
the earth and the past: “Ndemi left a curse. His children were never to 
abandon this land: they were to defend it with blood, it and all that it 
produces.”21 With the conversion of the land into equity (simply another 
asset lacking historic value except insofar as it allows for the production of 
Theng-eta), it can be mortgaged in the form of factories; capital dissolves the 
bond between, as it were, Blut und Grund), the bond between the earth and 
mortals has been severed. The land has been, effectively, if not “abandoned” 
then ceded to the force of capital; what the land, now “defenseless” against 
the force of capital, “produces” is an anathema, an unthinkable, something 
unconscionable, to Ndemi. There is no longer any reason to “defend with 
blood . . . all that it produces.” In fact, that moment in history has arrived 
where Ndemi’s “children” can only “defend the land” by “abandoning,” 
forswearing (a futile gesture), that which it “produces.” Is capitalism 
incompatible with dwelling? 
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In New Ilmorog the land itself has become a source of degradation. All 
that remains, as we speculate as to that which we already know, is to inherit 
the “curse.” In Petals of Blood’s romantic terms (the earth as the fundament of 
Sein), this inheritance is the surest sign that all possibilities for dwelling have 
been foreclosed. The best that Ndemi can hope for, if we cast him as a 
divinity, is that the terms of the curse—the abrogation of a historic pact 
between mortals (Ilmorog villagers who have, in the scheme of postcolonial 
capital, little economic value) and the earth (the village itself; all its 
dwellings, all its spaces) – are understood; that the old residents (as the new 
ones are of no significance) recognize the violence being done to dwelling in 
the cause of an a-historic capital.  
The Kenyan businessmen represent a capital impatient with the past 
and with dwelling as such, allowing Petals of Blood to, in Culler’s terms, 
make obvious the “poetics” of capital. The history of capital and/in the 
postcolonial state is not an argument Ngugi seeks to rehearse. Instead, his 
novel focuses on how the “technique” of capital (figured as the most obvious 
sign of the West because capital “originates” in the West, or made manifest 
through local entrepreneurs working with—in the interests of—global 
capital) in the postcolonial state demonstrates capital’s triumph over the 
state. Capital is everywhere, as likely to brand Theng-eta as a new drink as it 
is to expropriate natural resources of exploited local labor in Kenya or attack 
unions in Europe. Rather than belabor the effects of capital’s ubiquity 
through a critical interpretation (hermeneutics), Petals of Blood attends to the 
“technique” (poetics) of capital. The novel shows how the logic that drives 
capital—accumulation, profit, branding—is at once impervious to race 
(capital is capital, regardless of where it extracts wealth or who produces 
that wealth; marginal utility describes peripheral communities in 
postcolonial Kenya as much as it pertains to impoverished workers living at 
the fringes of a major European or US city) and attentive to the opportunities 
provided by African independence. In this logic, capital is neither white nor 
black, it is simply capital and as such capital has a keen understanding of 
how the politics of race can be mobilized to maximize the opportunities 
enabled by the changing of the political guard (as in the dreams it bequeaths 
to Kimeria and his colleagues). Capital is ruthless. Capital does not 
discriminate in an institutional sense—it does not value profits from black 
Kenya any more than those from Germany or Korea—but it does 
discriminate in that it makes ruthless economic decisions about value, 
utility, return on investments, and so on. Capital decides where to invest, 
and determines when new profits should be withdrawn or reinvested.   
Further, the monopoly sought and established by the black 
postcolonial elite in Petals of Blood is a function of the alliance between 
capital and the law. In fact, such is the influence of the elite that it might be 
impossible to distinguish capital from the law.22 The drive to “standardize 
production,” the expedient harnessing of the traditional resonances of 
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Theng-eta to the project of wide-scale marketing and distribution results in 
what Foucault, in his discussion of post-War German neo-liberalism, names 
the “point of fracture.”23  
The point of fracture, what distinguishes Ilmorog from New Ilmorog 
can also be understood in Weberian terms:24 Nyakinyua’s brewing of Theng-
eta marks the last (or one of the last) moments of community [Gemeinschaft] 
in Ilmorog. That first brewing, in which Abdulla, Wanja, Munira and others 
are initiated into the tradition, stands as a moment of Gemeinschaft. In this 
regard the standard distinction between community and society obtains. The 
community of Ilmorog, a series of interests and objectives that binds 
individuals, stands in contrast to the society, Kenya, broadly defined by a 
network of social relations; the community is geographically specific to 
Ilmorog while the society could potentially extend far beyond Kenya’s 
borders. The community’s brewing of Theng-eta serves to determine 
individual roles (taught by Nyakinyua), to transmit beliefs (the transcendent 
possibilities of the brew, if consumed properly, that is, historically) and the 
political values of Ilmorog. What follows from this communal act (in 
addition to autoimmunity), is Gesellschaft, configured here as that 
conjuncture where society and community might be said to meet, and where 
society (capital) begins to overwhelm community (the tradition of collective 
brewing). Gesellschaft is that “fractious point,” in truth, a moment of political 
crisis, in which the more formal (and thus impersonal) policies of social 
intervention manifest, “interventionism is pursued as the historical and 
social condition of possibility for a market economy,” and the “market 
economy” ensues, at the cost of the old Ilmorog.25 
The rise of a “market economy,” albeit one that is not in the least 
competitive (one of the foundational tenets of post-War German neo-
liberalism), transforms not only Theng-eta—how it is produced, consumed, 
understood, what cultural or economic “meaning,” if any, attaches to it –
makes all but unavoidable the emergence of New Ilmorog. “This poverty- 
and drought-stricken, depopulated wasteland” now comes complete with a 
highway, increased traffic, and the marginalization, yet again of course, of 
the inhabitants of old Ilmorog.26 No matter that for lifelong residents of the 
place, among whom Nyakinyua, Njuguna and Mutui number most 
prominently (residents who remember the time when the “land was not for 
buying. It was for use.”), it was still simply “Ilmorog,” that place where 
“[n]one of the promises had yet materialized. Ilmorog was still a kind of 
neglected outpost of the republic.”27 The contradiction of capital is fully 
manifest in Ilmorog. As a “neglected outpost” it was free to dwell (in 
moments, at least), as a site within the capitalist network (as a profitable 
venue) it was subject to the dictates of capital. Following its “capitalization” 
(investing in the community’s most marketable product), Ilmorog has to 
conform to the demands of the society (it is now enmeshed in a set of 
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multinational relations), the party (whose members seek to benefit from the 
investment of their capital) and the (absent, ineffective, indifferent) state.  
New Ilmorog may remain “poverty- and drought-stricken,” but it is 
now famous for being the birthplace of Theng-eta.28 New Ilmorog may be 
unfit for dwelling, may retain its status as just another postcolonial outpost, 
but it is now marked by its difference—designates both a temporal and a 
conceptual difference, resides in—its status as a site for the proliferation of 
black and multinational (that is, black and white) capital; its productivity, its 
transformation from site of marginal utility to one of multinational 
investment, no matter the ongoing discrepancy between rich and poor, 
makes it different. 
Ilmorog is, in this sense, originary. It is that place, in Petals of Blood’s 
political imaginary, which enabled the emergence of black capital. It is this 
status, unwanted though it may be by Nyakinyua and those who see the 
world as she does (keeping the residues of the past alive, despite the threats 
to it by a new political dispensation), that causes politicians, the local and 
national business elite to descend upon Ilmorog. The history that produced 
Theng-eta is, in a perverse way, what makes old Ilmorog superfluous and 
anachronistic to itself. The old Ilmorog cannot meet the needs of capital so 
New Ilmorog must be brought into being. In Petals of Blood’s terms, it is 
capital, more than the political structure of the postcolonial state 
(sovereignty, a new flag, a new anthem, the iconization of anti-colonial 
heroes, the public dreams of equality and fraternity that follows from black 
liberty), which marks the transition from colonial rule to black 
independence. 
 
“Letting Be”29 
“You can observe a lot,” as Munira does, “just by watching” the rural 
populace of the postcolonial nation dwell—before, that is, dwelling is 
threatened by the drought that leads to the capitalization of Ilmorog. 
Munira’s watching the women in their oneness with the “green earth,” 
resplendent, plentiful, constitutes an instance of postcolonial Africa (Kenya) 
“letting be.” To let be is to be at peace, as the women are. To dwell, says 
Heidegger, is “to be set at peace . . . to remain at peace within the free, 
within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its 
essence.”30 To let be, the women “free” to “safeguard” the earth—and “each 
thing” that they sow, plant, weed and reap—in its essence. To let be is to be 
“at peace within the free,” the freedom of the land, free to tend their own 
land, this “free sphere” that is, in this moment, theirs in a rare moment of an 
Ilmorog at peace—at peace with itself, at peace with the world, “each thing” 
in its place, “each thing” is let be. Here “each thing” means each person, 
their God/gods, the earth that allows them to plant, and the sky from which 
the rain comes, “within the free.” It is, tellingly, when the rain no longer 
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comes that peace—letting be—is no longer possible because the drought 
ruptures the harmony—the oneness, the shared “preserve”—of the fourfold. 
Peace depends, in Petals of Blood, on nothing so much as the oneness—when 
the “essence” of “each thing” is “safeguarded”—of the fourfold. In 
postcolonial Africa to let be is to know dwelling as the absolute condition for 
a postcolonial Africa at peace; to observe postcolonial Africa at peace is to be 
confronted with a postcolonial Africa embracing dwelling and being 
embraced by, folded into, dwelling. 
Under these conditions, the postcolonial becomes the act of writing for 
a different time, for a time other than the now (Nyayinkua looks to the past; 
Karega seeks a better future, narrowly conceived), a time, in Heidegger’s 
thinking, in which it is possible to dwell; but neither the past nor the future 
is, as we shall see, a time without violence. The breaks and ruptures between 
the time desired (where Wohnen obtains) and time itself (the extant political) 
allow for interruption (the event): a violent disordering. Such a violent 
disordering, Petals of Blood’s Theng-eta moment, makes of the present the 
time of the unheimlich (uncanny) – more than that, a time actively hostile to 
dwelling – that is, to Sein.  
Does dwelling emerge from violence? Is such an emergence possible? 
What, then, given the incipient presence of violence, is the relationship 
between dwelling and violence? Is it, as one would expect, that (the presence 
of) dwelling guarantees the absence of violence? When there is dwelling, it 
would follow, there is peace, there is letting be? And, symmetrically, (the 
presence of) violence signals the impossibility of dwelling? Iterated as 
questions, these inquiries give voice to a set of reasonable expectations. 
However, while it could be assumed that dwelling and peace are 
inveterately linked, and that dwelling, whether in the past (the women are at 
peace with the earth, the sky and the gods) or the future (as imagined by 
Karega: a socialist state), establishes peace, the question of violence remains 
obstinate in its presence. The presence of violence indicates not the absence 
of dwelling but the presence—the pertinence, the immanence—of the 
Heideggerian injunction: to think dwelling as the letting-be of all forms of 
economy and, as such, to think letting-be as the a/symmetrical economy of 
peace-violence; an economy of peace-violence, moreover, in which capital is 
neither destructive of or conducive to dwelling. Letting-be admits of 
capitalism as much as it does of any other mode of production; capitalism is 
thus not antithetical or inherently antagonistic to dwelling but it does, 
nevertheless, comprehend as such the potential violence—the force of 
disruption at the heart of capitalism—that capitalism is likely to bring.  
The women, in this regard, are neither at peace nor at war in their 
dwelling, they simply let-be the two; the women let-be any form of 
economy. In this economy, because of the force of letting-be, neither 
dwelling nor violence is ever fully present or truly absent. Dwelling, more so 
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than violence, is always subject to its own deconstruction; in many ways, of 
course, violence (in the form of capitalism or armed conflict) is the catalytic 
force that threatens (and may undo) dwelling. 
Violence is always incipiently, irrepressibly (constitutively?) present, 
at work in ways both discernible and surreptitious, under or within the 
condition of dwelling. It is never either violence or dwelling, dwelling or 
violence, because such a dis-junction (an uncoupling or a dichotomy), the 
unyoking of one from the other, is anathema to Heidegger. Dwelling and 
violence, then, are both fully Heideggerian conditions in that they must be 
thought. It becomes possible to assert, in this vein, that in “tracing the 
essence of dwelling” we have not only made both dwelling and violence 
“worthy of questioning” and “worthy of thought” but that we have “located” 
one in the time of the other, that we recognize how one constitutes (to a 
greater or lesser extent, itself in – and through – the time of the other;31 we 
have understood how to let-be.32 
It is for this reason that (postcolonial) dwelling is always haunted, by 
the prospect, nay, the inevitability, of death. In terms of the fourfold, death 
might be configured as another god because it always remains other and yet 
it is part of all language and economy (the economy of mourning, for 
example).33 The ambivalence of death makes it an ideal metaphysical topic 
because it structures everything and everyone; Wanja and Muturi, for 
example, mourn the death of what is lost – communal ownership of the 
land, the fidelity of one Ilmorog resident to her or his Nachbar; Karega 
mourns the death of Deedan Kimathi and with him the impossibility of a 
future free from exploitation of the poor and the marginal. Death is the 
(inevitable, irrepressible) negativity of chronological time. There is, then, no 
other time for the postcolonial (or, anyone else for that matter) but death, the 
only extant guiding structure or teleology. 
Conceived as such, it is no paradox that the very omnipresence of 
death makes it possible to dream of dwelling (we can only properly dwell) 
in the face of death. It is no contradiction that we dwell for the impossible 
even, especially, in the face of death. In this way it is imperative to always 
first think dwelling as its own, as articulating its own, deconstruction. 
Dwelling alludes to, it contains within itself, it demarcates, the khora 
(spacing), the space, the radical opening, that is the portal to death. To dwell 
is to know what it means to let-be, to live in, to live with, not despite, the 
presence of death. It is in this way that dwelling makes something “poetic” 
visible: dwelling enables us to “understand the techniques that make 
meaning possible” in the drama that is dwelling, postcolonialism and 
capitalism in Petals of Blood. The non-prescriptive ways in which Ngugi 
thinks dwelling in his novel enable us to understand how the “techniques” 
of letting-be work. Letting-be is not a way out of the drama that is dwelling, 
postcolonialism and capitalism. It is, rather, an engagement that uses the 
“techniques”—the meaning-making structures, if you will—of dwelling to 
2 4  |  L e t t i n g - b e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.811 
think capital in its relation to dwelling and to think postcolonialism in its 
relation to dwelling. It is, most importantly, to think how this nexus, 
dwelling, postcolonialism and capitalism, might be apprehended when 
dwelling constitutes the point of entrée. 
As such, the question is not really “What is it to dwell?,” although 
Heidegger’s query retains its historic capacity to haunt and to trouble our 
thinking of the postcolonial. The question is, rather, how does dwelling 
reorient the relationship between postcolonialism and capital? At the very 
least, it is because dwelling can no longer be understood as—reduced to—
that temporality that is coterminous with peace (the oneness of the Ilmorog 
women with the Kenyan earth) that new fractures between postcolonialism 
and capitalism become visible. And, out of these fractures emerges the more 
difficult, the more resistant (to resolving dwelling as a peaceful mode of 
existence) notion of letting-be. Thus letting-be is what emerges when 
dwelling, the initiation of human beings in time and space, opens into the 
coterminous—simultaneous—possibility of peace, violence, capitalism, 
socialist desire, and postcolonialism. Letting-be makes manifest the 
techniques of dwelling. 
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